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SECTION 6 OF GREAT BRITAIN'S PROTECTION OF
TRADING INTERESTS ACT: THE CLAW AND
THE LEVER

The Protection of Trading Interests Act' received royal assent
on March 20, 1980. It represents the most recent attempt by Great
Britain to curb the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law.? The Act enables the British Secretary of State to prohibit

compliance with requests by foreign ccurts for discovery of commercial documents. 3 It also establishes criminal penalties for disregarding that prohibition4 and prohibits the enforcement in British courts
of multiple damage judgments obtained in overseas countries.5 The
most important and novel section of the Act, however, is the 'clawback" provision of section 6. Where a qualifying defendant has paid
multiple damages pursuant to a foreign judgment, section 6 allows
the defendant to recover from the original plaintiff that portion of
the judgment which exceeds compensation. 6 Because the intended
I. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980. c. 11. reprintedin [1980] 959
TRUST & TRADE REG.

ANTI-

REP. (BNA) FI-F2.

2. In his introduction of the bill, Mr. Nott. the British Secretary of State. explained:
My objective in introducing this Bill is to reassert and reinforce the defences of
the United Kingdom against attempts by other countries to enforce their eco-

nomic and commercial policies unilaterally on us.
.T1hepractices to which successive United Kingdom Governments have
taken exception have arisen in the case of the United State'of America.

ihe United States has shown a tendency in certain respects over the past
three decades increasingly to try to mould the international economic ind trading world in its own image.
973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533-34 (1979).
3. Protection of Trading Interests Act. 1980. c. II. § 2.
4. Id. § 3.
5, Id. § 5.
6. Section 6 of the Act provides:
(1) This section applies wh c a court of an overseas country has given a judgment for multiple damages within the meaning'0f section 5(3) above against(r/)a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies; or
(b) a body corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom or in a territory
outside the United Kingdom for whose international relations Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are responsible- or

(c) a person carrying on business in the United Kingdom,
(in this section referred to as a "qualifying defendant") and an amount on
account of the.damages has been paid by the qualifying defendant either to the
party in whose favour the judgment was given or to another party who is entitled
as against the qualifying defendant to contribution in respect of the damages.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below, the qualifying defendant shall
be entitled to recover from the party in whose favour the judgment was given so
much of the amount referred to in subsection (1) above as exceeds the part attrib-
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effect of section 6 is to undermine American antitrust judgments
against British defendants, its operation is significant in light of several pending U.S. antitrust cases which involve British interests.7
More important, section 6 illustrates the tensions created when the
effect of one nation's regulation of its own economic environment is
felt world-wide.
This note first examines the United States' practices in the field
of trade regulation 'that spurred the passage of the Protection of
Trading Interests Act. Second, it examines the probable operation of
section 6. Third, the note analyzes that operation in terms of the
intended goals of Parliament in passing-the Act. Finally, the note
evaluates proposals that might alleviate problems created by the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.
utablc to compensation: and that part shall be taken to be such part of the
amount as bears to the whole of it the same proportion as the sum assessed by
the court that gave the judgment as compensation for the loss or damage sustained by that party bears to the whole of the damages awarded to that party.
(3) Sub.,ection (2) above does not apply where the qualifying defendant is an
individual who was ordinarily resident in the overseas country at the time when
the proceedings in which the judgment was given were instituted or a body corporate %,hich had its principal place of business there at that time.
(4) Sub-,ection (2) above does not apply where the qualifying defendant carned on business in the overseas country and the proceedings in which the judgment was given were concermnd with activities exclusively carried on in that
country

(5) A court in the United Kingdom may entertain proceedings on a claim
under this section notwithstanding that the person against whonfte proceedings
are brought is not within the jurisdiction of the court.
(6) The reference in subsection (i) above to Ln amount paid by the qualifying defendant inidudes a reference to an amount obtained by execution against
ht property or igainst the property of a company which (directly or indirectly) is
wholly ov ned by him; and references in that subsection and subsection (2) above
to the party in whose favour the judgment was given or to a party entitled to
contrbution include references to any person in whom the rights of any such
party have become vested by succession or assignbm nt or otherwise.
(7) This section shall, with the necessary modifickttions. apply also in relation
to any order which is made by a tribunal or authority of an overseas country and
would, if that tribunal or authority were a court, be a judgment for multiple
damages wiithin the meaning of section 5(3) above.
(8) This section does not apply to any judgmenct given or order made before
the passing of this Act.
Id § 6.
7. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980): United
States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., Crim. No. 79-00271 (D.D.C., filed June 1,-1979).
describedin [1979) 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A25-A26; United States% Bates. Cnm. No. 79-00272 (D.D.C., filed June 1. 1979), describedin 11979] 917 ANTI7RUSi & TRADE REG,-k'p. (BNA) A25-A26.
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I
THE PROBLEM: THE UNITED STATES,
EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND
BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY
When introducing the Protection of Trading Interests bill to
Parliament, British Secretary of State Nott identified three objectionable practices the United States had engaged in that prompted the
British action. Nott identified the first objectionable practice as the
expansive extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust lawsA Second, he criticized U.S. government agency regulations over persons
the British believe are outside U.S. jurisdiction. 9 Third, Nott
objected to the United States' claim of personal jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and over other companies in
which U.S. citizens hold substantial ownership interests when those
companies are domiciled and operating outside the United States.' 0
The following section analyzes each of these objections in greater
detail.
A.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES

ANTITRUST LAWS

1. Eiolution and Application of the "Effects, :Doctrine
The controversy surrounding the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law focuses on the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction." It is well-settled in international law that a nation has the
right to exercise jurisdiction over persona located or conduct occurring within its territorial boundaries.' 2 However, the United States
has pioneered the concept of claiming jurisdiction over the economic
and commerical activities of non-nationals who act outside U.S. ter13
ritorial boundaries but affect U.S. domestic concerns.
The Sherman Act' 4 is the United States' main vehicle for the
control of restrictive business practices in foreign comimerce. It provides: "every contract, combination .. or conspiracy, in restraint
8. See remarks of British Secretary of State Nott, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
1534-37 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Norr REMARKS].

9. Id. at 1537.
10. Id.
II. Jurisdiction is "[t]he power of a sovereign to affect the rights of persons, whether
by legislation, by executive decree, or by the judgment of a court." Beale, The Iurirdiction of/a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241, 241 (1923).
12. See Akehurst, Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, [1972-1973] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
146, 170-71; see also Hacking, The Increasing ExtraterritorialImpact of U.S. Laws A
Cause for Concern Amongst Friends ofAmerica, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 1 (1979).
13. See Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 Am.J. INT'L L. 558.

558-59 (1967).
14. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).

460

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL L,4WJOURN4L

[Vol. 14:457

of trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations, is declared to be
5
illegal."1
Initially, the Sherman Act was thought to apply only to acts that
occurred within the territorial boundaries of the United States.16 But
this interpretation proved to be short-lived.' 7 The landmark case of
United States P. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) Is drastically
altered territorial concepts of antitrust jurisdiction by extending the
reach of the Sherman Act to foreign combinations even when no
American firms are involved.19 Alcoa established what has become
known as the "effects" doctrine in American antitrust jurispru15 ld.§l
16 Amencan Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), was the first Supreme
Court case dealing with the issue of extratemtorial application of U.S. antitrust law.
Amencan Banana sued for treble damages under § 7 of the Sherman Act. It alleged that
United Fruit had instigated the Costa Rican government's seizure of American Banana's
plantation and railroad in order to monopolize the banana trade. United Fruit then
allegedly forced American Banana and other purchasers out of the market by outbidding
them. The Supreme Court held that these acts fell outside the scope of the Sherman Act
because.
the acts causing the damages were done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the
United States and within that of other states.
[Tihe general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lavful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done.
Giving to this complaint every reasonable latitude of interpretation, we
are of opinion that it alleges no case under the act of Congress and discloses
nothing that we can suppose to have been a tort where it was done. A conspiracy
in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts
and make them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law.
ld. at 355-56. 359.
17. Within four years of the American Banana decision the Supreme Court began to
expand its theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In United States v. Pacific & Arctic
Ry & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913). defendants conspired to monopolize certain
transportation facilities operating both within the United States and abroad. The agreement was made in the United States. Even though one df the combining parties was a
foreign corporation, the Supreme Court held that such acts were prohibited by the Sherman Act. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), further eroded American Banana. In SisalSales. defendants conspired to gain a complete monopoly over the
production and sale of sisal. Although discriminatory foreign legislation aided the conspiracy. the defendants made it effective by performing deliberate acts in the United
States and abroad. These acts brought about a monopoly in the United States. The
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction existed under U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 271.
18. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. ,Akcoa involved two cartel agreements between British. French, Swiss, German.
and Canadian ingot producers. Both agreements took place outside the United States'
territorial boundaries. In reversing the district court's judgment for the defendants.
Judge Learned Hand wrote for the majority:
lilt is settled law. . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
ts borders which the state reprehends.
Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within
the United States: and it follows from what we have just said that both were
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dence. 20 This doctrine allows a court to assert jurisdiction over any
conduct occurring outside U.S. territorial boundaries if the conduct
was both intended to affect U.S. commerce and did havd such an
effect.

21

The Alcoa effects doctrine has been criticized principally on two
grounds. First, critics complain that, although the doctrine purportedly accords with the objective territorial principle, 22 it exceeds the

bounds of accepted principles of jurisdiction. 23 Second, critics
characterize Alcoa and its progeny as attempts to export American
2
political and economic notions. 4
unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did
affect them.
Id at 443-44.
20, The Alcoa effects doctrine is deeply entrenched in American jurisprudence. Its
holding has often been cited with approval by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Wyandott Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493. 501 (1971); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690. 705 (1962): Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.
280, 288 n.16 t1952). In addition, the effects doctrine appears in modified form in
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES

§ 18 (1965).
21. The degree of effect on U.S. domestic or foreign commerce necessary to trigger
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act has never been settled. The Alcoa court
assumed that an intent to affect imports and some actual effect was sufficient. 148 F.2d at
443-44. Other courts have required a substantial and material effect upon U.S. foreign
and domestic commerce. See, e.g., United States v. V, =tchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.. [1963] TRADE CASES 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Department of
Justice has posited a somewhat stricter formulation requiring that the effects be both
substantial and foreseeable. See ANTITRUST DIVISION. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in [19771 799 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) El. and [1977) TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 266, pt.
22. Under the objective territorial principle, a state has jurisdiction over an offender
accused of a crime that consists partly of an act committed outside its territory and partly
of consecquencis that occur within its territory. 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
1525 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone 4th ed. 1977); see, e.g., The S.S. Lotus, [1927]
P.C.1.J. Ser. A., No. 10.
23. Two commentators have concluded that the facts of Alcoa support only a tenuous connection between the foreign activities at issue and-U.S. commerce. Professor R.
Y. Jennings recognizes the validity of the objective territorial principle, but limits its
applicability to those instances where the consequences of the act are an essential or
constituent element of the crime alleged. Alcoa, he asserts, overextends this concept by
covering effects that are mere repercussions of foreign conduct--even going as far as
covering repercussions that are ancillary to the purpose of the scheme, as in Alcoa itself.
Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, [19571 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 159-60, 164-70, 175. Another critic argues that Alcoa establishes a
.negative" effects doctrine. The agreement complained of in Alcoa resulted only in the
reduction of imports of aluminum. Although the defendants had no legal obligation to
continue importing the same amount of aluminum to the United States, the Alcoa court
found that this failure to import came within the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdictionin Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1967).
24. See Hacking, The IncreasingExtraterritorialImpact of U.S. Laws: A Causefor
Concern Amongst Friendsof.America, I Nw.J. INT'L L. & BUS. I (1979); Jennings, supra
note 23, at 175; Stanford, The A4pplicatioK'ofthe Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the
United States.:f Viewfrom Abroad II CORNELL INT'L L. J. 195 (1978).
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To counter these criticisms, recent decisions have injected international comity considerations into Aloca's effects doctrine. In
Timberlane Lumber Co. r. Bank of America, 25 the Ninth Circuit

ruled that "'[an effect on United States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is alone
not a sufficient basis on which to determine whether American
authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter of international comity and fairness." 26 The Timberlane court employed a tripartite analysis. First, to trigger the.Act, a foreign restraint must
27
affect or have been intended to affect American foreigzi commerce.
Second. the effect must be "'sufficittly large [so as] to present cognizable injury to the plaintiffs." 28 Third, the "interests of, and links to,
the United States-including the magnitude of the effect on foreign
commerce-[must be] sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other
nations. to justify an assertion of extraterritoria, authority." 29 The
court cited several factors that lower courts should weigh in balancing the foreign interests involved in such an analysis.3 0
The Third Circuit expressly adopied the Timberlane approach.
in Manningion Mills v Congoleum Corp. 31 Under the .41coa doctrine, the foreign activities alleged in Mannington Aills had a sufficient effect on U.S. foreign commerce to justify an assertion of
subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless', the Third Circuit thought
it necessary first to balance the interests of international comity
against domestic concerns before deciding whether it should exercise
12
jurisdiction.
Not all courts have agreed with the approach taken by the
Timberlane and Mannington Mills courts. The Seventh Circuit
recently refused to order such a balancing of interests in In re Ura25

549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir 1976).

26
27
2S.

Id at 613 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 615,
Id, at 613.

29 Id
Ji The cited factors include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy: the
nationalty or allegiance of the parties and thesitus of the business or corporation: the
extent to which enforcement by either state carf be expected to achieve compliance; the
impact on the United States as compared with the effects on other nations; the extent to
which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; the foresceabil- ity of such effect: and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within'the United States as compared with conduct abroad. Id. at 614.
31. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). In Mannington Mills. an American manufacturer
of floor coverings brought an antitrust action against a second American manufacturer.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant secured foreign patents by fraud, which, if perpetrated in
securing a domestic patent. would lead to antitrust liability.
32 Id. at 1297-98. The court concluded that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the plaintilrs complaint absent a record that would allow adequate evaluation of the
Tmberlane factors.
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nium Antitrust Litigation.33 The Seventh Circuit considered the tests
set forth in Manning/on Mills and Timberlane inapplicable on two
grounds. First, the court noted the Manning/on Mills factors are not
the law of the Seventh Circuit. 34 Second, the court considered the
circumstances in In re Uranium factually distinct from those in
Timberlane and Manning/on Mills. 3"
2

The British Objection

The British view the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law as an invasion of their sovereignty.3 6 In accordance with earlier
concepts of American territorial antitrust jurisdiction, 37 the British
believe that each sovereign should have exclusive jurisdiction over
persons and acts within its own territorial boundaries.'8 Furthermore, by applying the Alcoa effects doctrine, the British assert the
on economic
United States is unilaterally passing judgnient
39
problems that concern more than one country.
Not only do the British object to the assertion of jurisdiction by
American courts, but they also object to the actual operation of U.S.
antitrust law as well. If a plaintiff in a civil action successfully
40
proves a Sherman Act violation, he may recover treble damages.
33. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). In In re Uranium .4ntirust Litigation, Westing-

house instituted a U.S. antitrust action against twenty-nine world-wide producers of uranium and their subsidiaries. Several of the defendants, including Rio Tiuto Zinc (RTZ).
a British corporation. refused to appear. The trial court entered default judgments
against the abent defendants and ordered a proceeding to determine damages. The
answering defendants appealed, claiming that their cases would be severely prejudiced
by a determination of damages against the defaulting defendants. The governments of
Australia. Canada. South Africa, and the United Kingdom submitted amicus curiae
briefs challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter judgments against the absent
defendants.
34. Id. at 1255.
35. In Timberlane and in Mannington MI/s the defendants appeared and contested
the district courts' jurisdiction. In In re Uranium, the defendants defaulted, "cntuma,
ciously [refusing] to come into court and [present] evidence as to why the District Court
should not exercise its jurisdiction." id. at 1255-56. The court noted application of the
Manningron Mills factors in this instance would have placed the district court "in the
having to make specific findings with the defaulters refusing to
impossible position
appear and particiIR. , in discqvery." Id. at 1256. For a critical analysis of the In re
Uranium opinion, see 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 515, 521-23 (1980). The Westinghouse uranium suit has been the subject of much consternatior-in Great Britain. See Norr
REMARKS, supra note 8. at 1535-37.
36. See Norr REMARKS, supra note 8,at 1535.
37. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
38. See Norr REMARKS. supra note 8, at 1535. Nott believes U.S. courts and agencies, in applying the A/coa effects doctrine, pay too little attention to the interests of
foreign states.

39. Id. See also remarks of Lord Mackay of Clashfern, 404
ser.) 556 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MACKAY REMARKS].
40. Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).

PARL.

DEB., H.L. (5th
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4
The British, however, view treble damages as a penalty. 1 Because

the U.S. government can also prosecute a Sherman Act violation, the
British perceive the possibility of concurrent criminal and civil treble
damage proceedings as a form of double jeopardy.4 2 Furthermore,
because the British regard treble damage actions as penal proceedings, they object to the lack of certain safeguards that are normally
4 3

present in criminal prosecutions.

Finally, the British and American philosophies on restrictive
trade practices differ in emphasis.. U.S. antitrust law embodies a
strong suspicion of concentrated economic power.44 For example,
restrictive agreements are per se illegal even though in particular
instances they may produce procompetitive results. 4 5

Conversely,

4
British institutions are designed to facilitate the exercise of power. 6
The economic power of private business in Great Britain is unre47
strained unless and until there is substantial evidence of abuse.
Because it is less concerned about the mere existence of private economic power, British law focuses on the way in which monopolies

and restrictive associations exercise their power. 48 Thus, the United
Kingdom emphasizes the protection of small business as a primary
49
goal of restrictive trade law.

B.

EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION BY U.S.
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The Briiish not only object to extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law, but to the operation of other U.S. regulatory statutes.
These laws empower U.S. agencies to "'pursue inquiries or launch
proceedings against persons, who, according to [the British] view of
international law, are outside the jurisdiction of the United States." 5 0
As with anlitrust laws. the British object to American agencies'
41

See MACKAY REMARKS.

supra note 39. at 557.

42. Id.

43 In particular, the British note that the Sherman antitrust defendant need not be
present in the United States to be sued: the defendant is subject to wide-ranging discovcry of documents proceedings whether or not he appears: the defendant's failure to
appear is deemed an admission of the plaintiff's pleaded facts (or. as the British prefer to
characterize it. an admission of guilt); and the systems of class actions and contingency
fees combine to facilitate the bringing of actions, not with the discretion of a prosecuting
authority. but with financial profit as an incentive. See MACKAY REMARKS. supra note
39, at 557. NoTr REiAR.KS. supra note 8. at 1536.
44. See Baker. .4ntittust Conflicts Between Friends: Canadaand the United States in
the Mid-1970r, II CORNELL INT'L L. J. 165. 166.1978).

45. See. e.g. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
46. See A. NEALE. THE ANTrrRTUST LAws OF THE U.S.A. 478 (3d ed. 1970).
47. Id. at 479.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. NoTr REMA.,RKS. supra note 8. at 1537.
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attempts to exercise unilateral control over any activity that has an
effect on U.S. commerce. 5' The British name the Federal Trade
Commission. the Federal Maritime Commission, the Securities and
Futures Trading ComExchange Commission, and the Commodity
52
agencies.
offending
the
among
as
mission
C.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES

Although a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter
53
of an action, it may lack control over the individual parties. Generally, a -British court, may assume personal jurisdictiop over a company only if it is incorporated oAr registered in- the United
Kingdom. 4 A company incorporated in" a country other than Great
Britain is subject to British company registration provisions only if it
has established a place of business in Great Britain.5 5 Thus, a forSee MACKAY REM IRKS, su7pra note 39. at 559.
52 See NorT REMARKS. supra note 8. at 1537. As an example of their complaint in
this area, the British point to the recent TransatlanticShipping Cases. United States v.
Atlantic Container Line. Ltd.. Crim. No. 79-00271: United States v. Bates. Crim. No. 7900272 (D.D.C.. filed June 1. 1979). describedin [1979] 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
Rtp (BNA) A25-A26. In June 1979 a federal grand jury indicted, among others, two
Bntish nationals and two shipping consortia in which there was a substantial British
representation. The indictments alleged that the firms conspired to fix prices outside the
'.ope of the rate-fixing agreements regulated by the Federal Maritime Commission. The
shipping firms and the indicted individuals plead nolo contendere to the charges. The
two British firms. Atlantic Container Line Ltd. and Dart Container Line Co. Ltd.. were
fined SI million and S800.000. respectively. The chief executives of each shipping company were fined the maximum S50.000 on misdemeanor charges. The settlement.
according to Justice Department officials, is the largest ever in a criminal case under the
Sherman Act. [1979] 918 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A29. Numerous civil
damage claims have been instituted against the defendants alleging the same conspiracy.
See No'rr REMARKS. supra note 8, at 1539. At present the civil cases are pending.
The British object.to. the Transatlantic Shipping Cases on two grounds. First, they
object to unilateral regulation of shipping. Since the high seas are under no particular
sovereign's control. Great Britain maintains that shipping regulation should be multilateral. Id. at 1538. The Federal Maritime Commission, in this instance however, asserted
rule-making jurisdiction over all pricing agreements concerning shipment of freight in
United States/Europe trade. Second, the British believe that limited regulation of shipping promotes lower costs and greater efficiency. Id. at 1538-39. Not only does the
assertion of U.S. regulation over international shipping undermine this goal, but the
heavy fines imposed in settlement of the criminal proceedings, coupled with the potential
civil damages from the pending treble damage suits, pose serious financial consequences
for the British shipping industry. Id. Moreover, the British estimate that, without the
deterrent effect of U.S. regulation, there could be a ten to fifteen per cent increase in the
Western allies' sea trade with the United States. See remarks of Mr. Lawrence. 973
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1574 (1979).

51

53. F.

JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE

534-35 (1965).

54. See Schmitthoff, The W'zoly Oxwed and the ControlledSubsidia, " [1978] J. Bus.
L. 218, 222.
55. Id. at 223. Section 406 of the Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6. c. 47, defines
an "overseas company" as a company incorporated outside Great Britain that has established a place of business in Great Britain. Every "overseas company" must, within one
month from the establishment of the place of business, deliver-in English--(I) a certified copy of its charter, (2) a list of its directors and secretary; and (3) the name and
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eign corporation operating outside Great Britain is not subject to the

jurisdiction of British courts. This is true even if the foreign corpora56
tion is wholly owned by British interests.
American courts, however, are more likely to consider the subsidiary and parent corporation as a single enterprise for the purposes
of exercising personal jurisdiction. 7 A foreign corporation, even
though it dces no business in the United States per se, might be subject to the power of U.S. courts and agencies merely because U.S.
citizens hold substantial ownership interests.58
The British object to the application of this American enterprise
entity doctrine. They believe U.S. courts and agencies claim jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of American companies without regard to the interests of the incorporating country. For
example, U.S. companies' subsidiaries and affiliates incorporated in
Great Britain are required to conform to U.S. regulatory provisions.
The British claim that enforcement of these U.S. regulations is
(1) 'prejudicial to British commercial and economic policies 59 and
addresses of one or more persons resident in Great Britain authonzed to accept service of
procem on behalf of the company Id. § 407(l). In addition, such a company must fie
annual accounts in the same manner as a British company. Id. §410(1).
56 See Schmitthoff. stpra note 54. at 223. British law maintains a general distinction between a subsidiary and parent. regarding them as two separate legal personae
een if one is wholly owned by the other and. for practical purposes, the two constitute
one economic unit. This concept of corporate separateness was explored in the se-minal
La5C Salomon v. Salomon & Co.. 11897] A.C. 22.
Bntish courts, however, have admitted two broad qualifications to the rule in the Saloman case First. the rule does not apply if the parent employs the controlled company as
its agent See. e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lewellin. 119571 1 W.L.R. 404. Second. if the controlled company constitutes an abuse of corporate form by operating as a
"'device and sham. a mask-which [the inicorporator] holds before his face." the court
may hold the parent responsible for the acts of its subsidiazy. Jones.v. Lipman. [1962] 1
WL R. 632. 836. For a more detailed analysis of lifting the corporate veil in Great Britain. see L. GOWER. MODERN COMPANY LAW 189-202 t1969). Markson, Corporate
Unreihng. Judicial.4ttitudes. 123 SOLICITORS' J. 831, 831-33, 848-50 (1979).
57. See K. BREWSTER. ANTITRUS- AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 60 (1958);
RiSTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIoNS

LAw OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 27. Comment d (1965); Vagts. The Global CorporationandInternationalLaw, 6 J. INT'L
L. & -- ON. 247, 250-53 (1971-72): Note. ExtraterritorialApplication of the ExportAdminM,stration.4mendnentrs of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L 741. 745-46 (1978).
58. See note 57 supra.
59. For example, The Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 24012420 (Supp. 111 1979). imposes penalties upon a United States person who fails to report
to the Department of Commerce that he has receiied a request to "take any action which
has the effect of furthering or supporting a restrictive trade practice or boycott fostered or
imposed by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United States or against
any United States person..
. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a){1) (1980). A United States person
is defined as "any person who is a United States resident or national, including . . .
controlled in fact foreign subsidiaries . .. of domestic concerns ....
" 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.1(b) (1980). A foreign subsidiary is presumed to be controlled in fact if
(i) the domestic concern beneficially owns or controls . . . more than 50
percent of the outstanding voting securities of the foreign subsidiary or

affiliate: [or]

_
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(2) has a direct bearing on the well-being of British citizens who
work for U.S. regulated corporations in Great Britain. 60
II
A REACTION: SECTION 6 OF THE PROTECTION
OF TRADING INTERESTS ACT
In reaction to objectionable U.S. practices, the British Parliament passed the Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980.61 To
deal with the problem of the extraterritorial scope of private U.S.
antitrust actions, the Act contains a sc.-zalled "clawback" remedy in
section 6. In essence, section 6 states that a qualifying defendant
who has paid an amount pursuant to a multiple damage judgment in
an overseas country may recover from the awarded party that part of
the judgment that exceeds compensation. 62 A proper analysis of the
section must answer questions concerning who may recover, against
whom, under what circumstances, and in what amount.
A.

WHO MAY RECOVER?

Section 6 limits recovery under the statute to "qualifying
defendants." A qualifying defendant is defined as a citizen of the
United Kingdom, a corporation incorporated in the United Kingdom, or a person carrying on business there.63 Because British law
defines person to include a corporation, 64 a foreign corporation that
carries on business in the United Kingdom is eligible to use the statute. 65 If, however, the defendant is ordinarily. resident in the over(ii)

the domestic concern beneficially owns or controls ... 25 percent or more
of the voting securities of the foreign subsidiary . . . if no other person
owns or controls. . . an equal or larger percentage.
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c) (1980). For an explanation of the British objection toithe Export
Administration Act and other instances where the U.S. extends its jurisdiction over the
foreign subsidiary of a domestic corporation, see Nor-r REMARKS, supra note 8. at 1537;
MACKAY REMARKS, supra note 39, at 559-60.
60. See NoTr REMARKS, supra note 8, at 1537; MACKAY REMARKS. .upra note 39. at
559-60. United States interests are responsible for over nine per cent of employment in
Great Britain. See remarks of Lord Hacking, 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1520
(1980).
61. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 , c. i1.
62. Id. § 6(l) and (2). This provision allows a qualifying defendant suing in British
courts to recover two-thirds of any treble damage award the defendant paid a U.S. plaintiff as a result of a U.S. antitrus;claim.
63. Id. § (1)(a)-(c).
64. See Interpretation Act, 1978, c. 30. § 5, sched. I.
65. In order to "carry on business" under British law, the activity must be of a somewhat permanent character, as opposed to an isolated transaction, and must involve some

degree of management and control. See Brown v. London & N.W. Ry.. 122 Eng. Rep.
481; Graham v. Lewis [18881 22 C.B.D. 1;But see Cornelius v. Phillips, [1918 A.C. 199.
See also Transport & General Credit Corp. v. Morgan, [19391 1 Ch. 531, 549-52; Re
Brauch. Ex parte Britannic Securities & Investments Ltd. [19781 I All E.R. 1004. Pre-
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seas country in which the multiple damage proceedings were
brought or is a corporation whose principal place of business" is in
the overseas country, section 6 does not apply. 67 Hence, a U.S. corporation that does business in the United Kingdom would not ordinarily qualify as a defendant for the purposes of this section.
Interestingly, a foreign subsidiary of the same U.S. corporation
could use the statute so long as it had been brought in as a defendant
in the original action and was either incorporated or carried on business in Great Britain. 5

B.

AGAINST WHOM MAY T;iE STATUTE BE USED?

The qualifying defendant may recover against the party in
whose favor the judgment was given. 69 If the awarded plaintiff is not
located within British territory, the Act provides for service of process outside'the United Kingdom. 70 Moreover, if the plaintiff fails to
7t
appear. the qualifying defendant may obtain a default judgment.
The defendant may then execute the judgment against any property
,,umablk th,, ,.ould include all foreign corporations that register in Great Britain a.,,
"'oerseas companies'* under § 406 of the Companies Act. 1948. See note 55 siupra.
('uriousl,. a foreign corporation that does business in both the United States and
Great Britain may imoke the statute. If. for example. a French corporation has branch
olfices in both the U.S and in Great Britain and engages in restrictive business practice.,
affecting U S commerce, the American courts could claim jurisdiction and a plaintiff
could reo%,er treble damages. For the purposes of the Protectior" of Trading Interests
Act. the French corporation would be carrying on business in Great Bitain and could
recover so long as the restrictive practices did not occur "'exclusively" within the United
States. See remarks of British Secretary of State Nott and Mr. Ogden, 973 PARL. DEB..
H C (5th sr.) 1032-33 (1979). Diplomatic Note from American Embassy. London to
British Secretary of State Nott (Note No. 56. dated Nov. 9. 1979) (copy on file at the
Cornell International Law. Journal).

66. Although the meaning of the term "principal place of business" is not defined by
statute and has not been litigated in British courts, analogous terms, such as a corporation's "ordinary residence*" and "principal office." reveal common principles that would
most likely be applied in interpreting the words of the Act. , For the purpose of taxing
income, a corporation's business is carried on where "the central management and control actually abides." DeBeers Consol. Mines. Ltd. v. Howe. 11906] A.C. 455. 458
Where a company is "ordinarily resident" is a question of fact: the place of incorpora-.
lion. although a factor to be considered, is not determinative. Egyptian Delti Land v.
Todd. 119291 A C. I. A company's "pnncipal office" is where the general superintendence and management is carried on. Garton v. Great Western Ry. [1858] E.B. & E.
1837. Palmer v. Caledonian Ry. 118921 Q.B. 823.
67. Protection of Trading Interests Act. 1980. c. 1. § 6(3).
68. This is because of the distinction the British maintain between-a parent and its
subsidiary. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. The parent's corporate situs is not
attributed to the subsidiary, and the exception to § 6 does not apply.
69. Protection of Trading Interests Act. 1980, c. 11. § 6(2).
70. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980. c. i1, § 6(5). In order to give effect to
this provision, the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11,rule l(l)(/) was amended to
allow servi --ofr-rit oui of the jurisdiction for all actions brought under the Act. [19801
STAT. INST. No. 629.
71.

Eng. Sup. Ct. Rule 1965 (Order 13, r. i). reprinted in I. JACOB, P. ADAMs, R.
& K. McGUFFIE. THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (1970).
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of the awarded plaintiff that is located in Great Britain.72 A different
result occurs if the awarded plaintiff is a company incorporated
outside the jurisdiction of Great Britain and owns or controls a subsidiary in Great Britain. This "property" cannot be used in satisfac73
tion of a section 6 judgment.
An awarded plaintiff cannot escape liability by assigning his
claim to another party.74 Finally, the section does not apply to crim75
inal antitrust actions or to agency regulations.
C.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY A
DEFENDANT R-COVER?

A qualifying defendant may recover "where a court of an overseas country has given a judgment for multiple damages" 76 and the
qualifying defendant has paid an amount on account of the damages. 7 7 Because a sum must be paid pursuant to a judgment, 78 a
defendant may not sue for damages he anticipates paying. A court
of an overseas country must have "'given a judgment for multiple
damages."'7 Hence, if an antitrust case is settled before a judgment
is rendered, the section has no application.
Where the qualifying defendant carried on business in the overseas country and the proceedings in which the judgment was given
were concerned with activities exclusively carried on in that country,
the statute does not apply.8 0 The British courts' interpretation of
"exclusively" is uncertain, however. It is conceivable the British
72. See Seneralli 17 HALSBtJRY'S LAws OF ENGLAND. supra note 22, 11 406, 462.
471. 547.
73 The subsidiary's assets may conceivably be used in satisfaction of a § 6 judgment
if the subsidiar was a named plaintiff in the original antitrust action. Several amend-.
mints were proposed that would have allowed recovery against a subsidiary even if it
was not a named party: all. however, were defeated. See Report ofStanding Committee F.
Protection of Trading Interests Bill 66-69 (Second Sitting 1980). 404 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(5th ser.) 938-43, 950-52 (1980); 973 PARL. DEB.. H.C.'(5th ser.) 1025-39 (1979).
Although under British law legislative history is not authoritative. see R. CROSS. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

139-41 (1976), and thus Parliament's refusal to adopt specific

language allowing such recovery would not necessarily-determine how a British court
would interpret the Act. British case law maintains the distinction between a subsidiary
and parent. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
74. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980. c. 11. § 6(6).
75. Multiple damages are not given for criminal violations of the Sherman Act.
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
76. Protection of Trading lntebepts Act. 1980, c. I1. § 6(t). The ,i-ct defines multiple
damages as "an amount arrived ai by doubling, trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum
assessed as compensation for the loss~or damage sustained by the person in whose favour
the judgment is given." Id. § 5(3).
77. Id. § 6(]).
78. Id. Under the Act, a defendant is considered to have paid damages if he paid an
amount to either the awarded plaintiff or to a co-defendant entitled to contribution. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 6(4).
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courts will interpret "exclusively" so broadly that, if only one of the
prohibited activities was carried on outside of the overseas country,
the qualifying defendant could still claim the benefit of the section. 8'
D.

WHAT MAY A QUALIFYING DEFENDANT RECOVER?

A successful plaintiff in an American antitrust action is entitled
to recover a sum equal to three times his proven damages. 2 The
Protection of Trading Interests Act allows a qualifying defendant to
recover from the plaintiff that portion of the amount he has paid "as
exceeds the part attributable to compensation." 8 3 If an American
court forces the defendant to pay treble damages, the part attributable to compensation will always be one-third of the amount the
defendant has actually paid in satisfaction of the judgment. s4 For
example, if an American court determined that the plaintiff sustained damages of $6 million, it would award a judgment of three
times that, or $18 million. If the defendant paid the full $18 million,
the qualifying defendant could recover two-thirds of the award, or
S12 million. Because the recovery is tied to the actual amount paid,
regardless of whether the U.S. judgment has been satisfied in full,
the qualifying defendant may recover two-thirds of whatever he has
paid. Therefore, in the example above, if the defendant paid only $6
million of the $18 million judgment, he would be able to recover $4
million (two-thirds of $6 million) under section 6. When used in this
circumstance, the statute not only cuts against the treble damage
portion of the judgment but also against the compensatory portion.
81 British Attorney General Sir Michael Havcrs indicated that -"exclusively" would
be interpreted s-. as to exclude only those businesses operating wholly within the United

States from using the statute.
Where there is a subordinate. or subsidiary, business which is acting in. say. the
United States, all of its activities are there and nowhere else, we think that it
',ould be unfair to give it the clawback protection under subsection (1). We are
trying to distinguish what one might call a wholly domestic operation within the
United States jurisdiction.
Standiit' Commitee Fon Protecuon of Trading Interests BiAl. 973 PARL. DES.. H.C. (5th

scr.) 71 (1979). See also Diplomatic Note from American Embassy. supra note 65. at 6.
82 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
83 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c, II. § 6(2).
84. Section 6(2) defines the amount attributable to compensation under a proportional formula. The pan attributable to compensation "shall be taken to be such part of
the amount [paid] as bears to the whole of [the amount paid) the same proportion as the
sum assessed . . . as-compensation for loss or damage . .. bears to the whole of the
damages awarded." Id.
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III
SECTION 6: A COUNTERFORCE AND AN
INVITATION TO NEGOTIATE'
The goal of Parliament in enacting the Protection of Trading
Interests Act was to restrict the extraterritorial application of U.S.
trade regulation. An analysis of section 6 shows that the Act functions both as a counterforce and as an invitation to negotiate; that is,
both as a "claw" and a "lever."
A.

I.

SECTION 6 AS A COUNTERFORCE

PotentialEffects

Section 6 is a significant attempt to curb the extraterritorial
application of U.S. trade regulation. Not only does it provide a
novel remedy for its own citizens and corporations, but it is available
to both foreign corporations and U.S. subsidiaries so long as those
companies carry on business within the United Kingdom.8 5 Moreover, even if the awarded plaintiff is not within British jurisdiction, a
section 6 action may be brought in British courts and a qualifying
defendant may obtain a default judgpent and execute against the
awarded plaintiff's property in Great Britain.8 6 Finally, in some
situaions, the section 6 remedy can cut into the compensatory por8 7
tion of the overseas judgment.
Section 7 of the Act provides for the reciprocal enforcement of
any clawback provision of a country that enforces a section 6 judgment."8 The reciprocal enforcement provision is intended to have
two effects. First, the provision may serve as an incentive for other
countries to pass clawback provisions similar to the British version,
thus increasing the number of antitrust defendants who would be
able to recover the noncompensatory portion of treble damage judgments. Second, reciprocal enforcement of the British clawback provision will allow a British qualifying defendant to execute against
the property of an awarded plaintiff even if that plaintiff had no
85.
86.
87.
88.

See notes 63-68 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
Section 7 provides:
(1) If it appears to Her Majesty that the law of an overseas country provides
or will provide for the enforcement in that country of judgments given under
section 6 above, Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for the enforcement in the United Kingdom ofjudgments given under any provision of the law
of that country corresponding to that section.
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 7.
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recoverable assets in Great Britain. 9 At present, Canada, Australia,
and a number of other Commonwealth nations are considering similar clawback provisions. If such provisions are enacted elsewhere,
section 6, in conjunction with the reciprocal enforcement provision
of section 7,present a formidable threat to U.S. antitrust plaintiffs. 9°
2

Limitations

Despite the seemingly broad scope of the Act, sect-on 6 has
some severe limitations. Its most signifcant limitation concerns the
fact a qualifying defendant may not recover against a subsidiary of
the awarded plaintiff unless that subsidiary was a party to the original action. 9' Because subsidiaries incorporated in Great Britain
account for nearly all U.S. investment in that country, 92 it is unlikely
that section 6 will have any significant impact on American antitrust
plaintiffs unless the subsidiaries are parties to the U.S. antitrust
actions. 9- Further, plaintiffs who have unincorporated assets in
Great Britain could easily withdraw those assets from the country or
89. If the British Crown. by Order in Council. provided for the reciprocal enforcement of a foreign country's clawback provision in Great Britain, conflict of law problems
would anse concerning the scope of recovery. If the foreign clawback provision allowed
recovery against a nonparty subsidiary of an original plaintiff, it is questionable whether
British courts would enforce tlhS judgment against such a subsidiary in Great Britain. A
foreign defendant seeking such recovery would need to overcome two obstacles. First, a
British court could decide that the question of wh'ither a foreign defendant seeking to
enforce a judgment against a subsidiary of an awarded plaintiff is one of procedure. In
that case. British procedural law would apply. Generally. British choice of law rules
dictate what law is to apply in substantive matters. But procedural questions are governed by the law of the forum. See 8 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 769 (Lord
Hailsham of St. Marylebone 4th ed. 1977). .Methods of enforcement of judgments are
considered procedural. Id. 1 786. However, the question of who is the appropriate party
to an action can be either substantive or procedural. Id. 1 772. Second, British courts
will not enforce a judgment if it is contrary to public policy. Id. 1 728. 762. A court
could decide that, because British law maintains a strict distinction between parent and
subsidiary corporations, see note 56 supra, it would be contrary to British public policy to
allow recovery against the subsidiary.
90. See [19801 973 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A19-A20: [1980 980
ANTITRUST & TRAD REG. REP. (BNA) A13: [1980) 307 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
C4.

91. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
92. The subsidiary is the "most favored form of organization of U.S. affiliates in the
U.K., [accounting] for 80% of the number of large investment companies and for 90% of
their assets." J.DUNNING, U.S. INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN 12 (1976). Although figures for
small investment companies are unavailable, large investment companies represent the
most significant share of U.S. investment in Great Britain. Small investment companies
account for only 6.8% of the total value of U.S. investment in the United Kingdom. Id.
at 32.
93. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. Parliament was particularly concerned that § 6 would have little deterrent value or practical application. See, e.g.,
remarks of Mr. Jeffrey Thomas, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1027 (1979): remarks of
Lo rd Lloyd of Kilgerran, 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 938 (1980).
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incorporate them, thus circumventing the operation of the statute. 94
In addition, section 6 does not apply to antitrust settlements
where no judgment is given. 5 In theory, then, section 6 will give a
British defendant incentive not to settle. Because section 6 provides
a clawback remedy, the defendant risks only the damages the plaintiff can actually prove. Given the difficulties of recovery in Great
Britain, 96 however, it is doubtful that the statute will provide a realistic inducement not to settle. Thus, in settlement situations, a British
corporation could still be subject to the broad scope of U.S. trade
regulations while lacking feasible recourse to British courts.
Finally, section 6 does not apply to public antitrust actions. 97 In
those actions, a British defendant corporation continues to be subject
to American theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction with little chance
of protection.98
B.

SECTION

6

AS AN INVITATION TO NEGOTIATE

Section 6 also attempts to restrict the scope of U.S. trade regulation by encouraging negotiation. Throughout the consideration of
the Protection of Trading Interests Act, the British government
repeatedly emphasized that it prefers to resolve the problem of extraterritoriality through negotiation.9 9 Although the United States and
Great Britain have attempted to resolve the problem through negoti94. Parliament itself recognized this significant loophole. During debate while the
bill was in Committee, Mr. Jeffrcy Thomas remarked: "[Corporate partics. .. in some
circumstances could prevent recovery back against them of damages by the United Kingdom person or company and enforcement to the letter of damages abroad against their
United Kingdom assets by the simple expedient of operating through different corporate
entities in the United Kingdom." Standing Committee F on Protection of Trading Inter-

ests Bill, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 67 (1979).
Although the distinction between a subsidiary and a parent is not absolute in. Great
Britain, see note 56 supra, the establishment-of a subsidiary is the best way to protect
assets from the reach of § 6. The corporation, however, must take care to separate the
activities of the subsidiary from its own. British courts will maintain the subsidiaryparent distinction so long as the business of the parent is not the business of the subsidiary. For a detailed analysis of when a British court is likely to lift the corporate Veil, see
L. GOWER. MODERN COMPANY LAW 194-217 (1969).
95. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying texti
96. See notcs 91-95 supra and accompanying text.
97. See nott 75 supra and accompanying text.
98. Although §§ 1-4 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act are aimed at blocking
discovery in both civil and public antitrust cases, their effect on the prosecution of antitrust violations by the Justice Department is limited. In both the TransatlanticShpping
and the In re Uranium cases Parliament attempted to block discovery. Such blocking.
although a hindrance to the investigation, was not fatal. See [1979] 917 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A25-A26; [1979] 940 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
-A-AIO.
99. See Nor REMARKS, supra note 8. at 1542-48; MACKAY REMARKS, supra-note
39, at 1518. See also Diplomatic Note from British Embassy, Washington, D.C. to U.S.
Department of State (Note No. 225, dated Nov. 27, 1979) (copy on file at the Cornell
InternationalLaw Journal).
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ation in the past, according to the British the attempts have accomplished little.'" Despite its limitations, the Act now allows Great
Britain to negotiate and bargain from strength.
I

Briain"s Increased BargainingStrength

As stated above, the greatest limitation on the effectiveness of
section 6 is that it normally does not allow recovery from the subsidiaries of an awarded plaintiff. Parliament was aware of this limitation when it enacted section 6.101 Parliament nonetheless resisted
taking steps that would further strengthen section 6, believing that
the clawback provision in its present form was a drastic enough
measure."'' 2 The Act's legislative history indicates, however, that
absent a significant restriction in the scope of U.S. trade regulation,
Great Britain would consider an amendment to allow recovery by a
qualifying defendant against the assets of a subsidiary owned by the
awarded plaintiff--even if the subsidiary was not a named party to
the action."' Such an amendment, coupled with the reciprocal
enforcement provision of section 7, would significantly disrupt overseas enforcement of U.S. antitrust law.
2

Britain's Disinclinationto Retaliate

Section 6 is clearly an invitation to negotiate and not to retaliate. The Protection of Trading Interests Act has two basic goals: the
reassertion cf British sovereign rights in the area of trade regulation
and the protection of vital domestic and economic interests. 0 4 Parliament did not intend to export British economic policies, 05,to disturb British obligations concerning recognition ofjudgments,'0 6 or to
challenge domestic enforcement of U.S. antitrust law.' 0 7
Both Parliamentary debates and the plain language of the statute illustrate that Parliament carefully drafted the Act with the intent
of avoiding retaliatory action. For example, the Act was deliberately
drafted to siay within traditional British views regarding both subI ) See NorT- Ri-MARKS. supra note 8, at 1542-48; MACKAY REMARKS, supra note
39. at 1is

101 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
102. See NoTT REMARKS, supra note 8, at 1035-36:
39. at 942.

MACKAY REMARKS, Supra note

103. See remarks of British Undcr-Secretary of State Tebbit, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C.

(5th ser.) 1586 (1979).
104. See remarks of Mr. Thomas. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1577 (1979).

105. Id.
106. See Diplomatic Note from British Embassy. Washington. D.C. to U.S. Department of State (Note No. 225. dated Nov. 27. 1979) (copy on file at Cornell International
Law Journal).
107. See remarks of Mr. Lawrence, 973 PARL. DEB.. H.C. (5th ser.) 1572 (1979).
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ject matter and personal jurisdiction.'0 8 A qualifying defendant
must demonstrate a cognizable connection to British economic interests--only British citizens, British corporations, and persons doing
business in the United Kingdom are entitled to bring actions under
the Act."09 Furthermore, under section 6 a British court will assert0
personal jurisdiction only over parties to the original proceedings. 1,
Assets belonging to an independent economic entity, even if that
entity is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the original plaintiff, are not
normally subject to the reach of the clawback."' Finally, Parliament knowingly restricted the effectiveness of the clawback provi2
sion to avoid inviting retaliatory --ction by the United States.'
Considering the threat posed to the application of U.S. trade
regulation, it is in the interest of the United States to negotiate.
What is needed, however, is a proposal that will be acceptable to all
sides.
IV
ACCOMODATING THE INTERESTS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY:
A PROPOSAL
An acceptable and workable solution to the present conflict over
regulation of transnational commercial activities must strike a, balance between the interests of extraterritoriality and sovereignty. The
United States' expansive extraterritorial application of antitrust law
is ultimately aimed at protecting the U.S. economy."13 The United
States believes this protection is best accorded by pursuing a policy
108. See No'rr REMARKS, supra note 8, at 1033, 1035. The traditional British view of
subject matter jurisdiction is that a sovereign has exclusive jurisdiction only over persons
and acts within its own territorial boundaries. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
A British court may assume personal jurisdiction over a company only if it is incorporated or registered in the United Kingdom. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
In addition, British law embodies a strict theory of corporate separateness. See note 56
suir'o.

109. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
110. See generally Protection of Trading Interests Act. 1980, c. 11, § 6(1). See also
note 73 supra and accompanying text.
I 11. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
112. The fact that assets owned by a subsidiary of the original plaintiff are not recoverable under § 6 significantly reduces the effectiveness of the clawback provision. See
notes 91-93 upra and accompanying text. The British, however, feared that a stronger
provision would invite retaliation by the United States. See remarks of British UnderSecretary of State Tebbit, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1590 (1979).
113. According to the United States, its attempts to eliminate international restrictive
business practices are, in part, a response to requests by "'numerous international resolutions and declarations." See J. Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust: An American View
(unpublished paper delivered at International Chamber of Commerce Conference on
Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws, March 12, 1981) 1-2 (copy on file at
the CornellInternationalLaw Journal).
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that promotes competition through -the dispersion of economic
power."1 4 Because the U.S. economy is so affected by activities in
the international marketplace, some control over those activities is
justified.'
As the strenuous objections of the British government illustrate,"16 however, other nations have an interest in asserting their
sovereign rights to control activities within their own territorial
boundaries. Central to this assertion of sovereign rights is the interest of an individual nation in protecting its companies and citizens
and in promoting general economic well-being. The right to exclude
burdensome or conflicting regulation by nations only peripherally
connected to these concerns must be recognized.
A.

INADEQUACY OF RECENT ATTEMPTS

Recent unilateral attempts at solving the complex problem of
balancing these national interests have proved to be inadequate and
unacceptable. The United States' unilateral assertion of jurisdiction
over international commercial activities has drawn criticism for its
'failure to accomodate other nations' interests." 7 Section 6 of the
Protection of Trading Interests Act, if accompanied by similar legislation in other countries, might provide some inducement to the
United States to eliminate or curtail use of the effects doctrine. But
such an approach will not solve the problem. Section 6, in its present
form, provides little realistic protection to British persons subject to
U.S. treble damage judgments" t"and thus does not effectively represent British interests in preserving sovereignty and-protecting the
British economy. The British, however, are reluctant to enact a
stronger provision because they do not want to violate their own
114. See Baker. note 44 supra.

115. Extraterritorial application of antitrust law is not unique to the United States.
Several other countries have adopted an effects doctrine in one form or another. For
example. German antitrust law applies to al .restraints of competition "which have
effects. . [in West Germany]. . .even if they result from acts d ne outside. . .[the
country)." Acts Against Restraints of Competition of July 27. 1957. [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt IBGBI] § 08(2) (W. Ger.) (as amended). According to the Canadian Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission. "where any overt act which takes place in Canada flows
from an agreement which is contrary to the public policy, public interest or public order
of Canada. such agreement comes within Canadian jurisdiction even if it were not made
in Canada."

RESTRICTIVE

TRADE

PRACTICES

COMMISSION.

SHIPPING CONFERENCE

ARRANGEMENTS AND PRACTICES (Ottawa 1%5). reprinted in W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 16.14 (2d ed. 1976). The EEC has adopted a

similar approach to extraliiritoriality. See Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Com-

mission des Communautes Europeennes, [19721 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 556 (1972), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8161.
116. See; e.g.. note 36 supra and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., note 39 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 91-93 & 112 supra and accompanying text.

1981]

PROTECTION OF TRADING INTERESTS ACT

principles of jurisdiction ' 9 or to invite retaliation by the United
States.' 20
Thus, a unilateral approach on the part of either the United
States or Great Britain will not solve the problem. Rather, a bilateral or multilateral solution reached through face-to-face negotiation
and compromise would better accomodate all interests- Ideally, an
international code on restrictive business practices would alleviate
the problem of extraterritoriality as well as recognize and accomodate sovereign interests.' 2' The United Nations Conference on
Restrictive Business Practices recently adopted aA international
code; 22 however, it is only voluntary. 23 Experts agree that given
the "wide differences between countries in economic, social, political
on restricand legal institutions and policies, an international 2code
4
tive business practices is not a realistic possibility."'
B.

A

BILATERAL PROPOSAL

Because a multilateral approach to solving the problem of international regulation of restrictive business practices is, at least for the
present, unlikely, bilateral agreements between the United States
and concerned nations present the most attractive alternative. The
United States has employed a bilateral approach to the problem of
extraterritoriality in the past. For example, it has executed agreements with Germany' and with Canada 26 providing for notification and consultation concerning antitrust actions affecting each
119. See note '08 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
121. A code covering only transnational commercial activities would allow individual

states to regulate purely domestic concerns. For example, the definition of affected enters.
prises under the OECD Competition Guidelines, OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1979) introductory 8, suggests that such an agree-

ment covers only multinational enterprises. If the code had its own enforcement mechanism, those injured by restrictive business practices abroad could obtain relief through
that mechanism, thus eliminating-The need for the American effects doctrine approach.
122. See United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, The Set of

Mutually Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, U.N. Doe. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), reprintedin [1980] 963 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) G-1.
123. Id.; see also Davidow, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law in a

Changing World, 8 L. & POL. IN'L Bus. 895, 910 (1976). For an interesting analysis of
the effectiveness of the UNCTAD Code, see Oesterle, United Nations Conference on
Restrictive Business Practices, 14 CORNELL INT'L L J. 1 (1981).
124. Primoff. InternationalRegulationof M,.tinationalCorporationsandBusiness-The
United Nations TakesAfim, 11 J. INT'L L. & POL. 287, 289 (1976).

125. See Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding'Restrictive Business
Practices, (June 23, 1976), United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956,
T.I.A.S. No. 8291, reprintedin 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) § 50,283.
126. See Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure Between Canada and the
United States, U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release, Nov. 3, 1969, reprintedin 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH)

50,112.
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other's interests. These agreements do not go far enough, however.
to alleviate the problems where both the effects in the United States
and foreign interests are strong.' 27 Several considerations should
guide any future attempts to draft an effective bilateral agreement.
First. in order for any agreement to be reached, it is logical that
the United States must surrender either subject matter or personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations in antitrust actions t 21 , Therefore, in antitrust actions, the United States should eliminate personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. including foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies, when those corporations are domiciled and operating wholly outside the United States.)29 If the foreign corporation
is conducting business in the United States, even if the acts giving
rise to the antitrust violation are committed outside U.S. territorial
boundaries. American courts could still exercise jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation." ) In that instance, other nations may be
assured that the United States has a cognizable and legitimate interest in the regulation of a foreign corporation's commercial activities

11

1

Second. a joint tribunal should be set up to regulate the conduct
of multinational corporations whose operations affect several different countries. The findings and orders of the tribunal would be
given the force of law in each of the countries signing the treaty.
Thus each affected state would have the opportunity to regulate
industry affecting its trading interests.
Finally. because the United States will have declined jurisdiction over many foreign corporations, reactionary legislation such as
section 6 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act would be unnecessary. Ideally. the activities of the joint tribunal would sufficie'itly
protect British trading interests.
"
127 Canada is presentlv considering a clawback provision similar to Great Britain's
in an attempt to combat U.S extraterntonal antitrust jurisdiction. See note 90 supra and
accompanying text.
128 For the British reaction to each of these areas of U.S. jurisdiction. see notes 36-39
& 59-60 supra and accompanying text
129 This limitation of junsdzction could be accomplished either through enabling legiMation or as a provision of the treaty itself. See generaly A. MCNAiR. THE LAw OF
T rLT .s79.81 (1961),
130. Juri:,diction through U.S. ownership is not the only -ay to show a foreign corporation is doing business in a country. For a general discussion of the "doing business"
test of personal jurisdiction, see RESTAT.ME~il (SECOND) OF CONFLiCT OF LAWS § 35
1971)
131. For example. regulation of foreign corporations doing business in the United
States should be acceptable to the British because international law generally recognizes
a corporaton's 'presence" in a country if it regularly conducts business there. Id.; see
also 1. BtALE. CONFLCrT OF LAWS § 41.4 (1935).
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CONCLUSION
The British Parliament recently enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act in reaction to the expansive extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. The most controversial aspect of the Act.
section 6. allows antitrust defendants suing in British courts to
recover the noncompensatory portion of multiple damage awards
paid to U.S. plaintiffs. The clawback provision, although representing a significant attempt to curb the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law, is subject to severe limitations. In view of those
limitations, the Act may be viewed as an attempt to curb extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law by inviting further negotiation
with the United States.
Any future negotiation concerning the regulation of transnational commercial activities must strike a balance between the interests of U.S. extraterritoriality and the sovereignty of other nations.
Past unilateral attempts have failed to reconcile these competing
considerations and multilateral solutions to the problem are impractical at present. Future attempts will most probably take the form of
bilateral agreements. They should have as their cornerstone a limitation on the U.S. exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations, the repeal of reactionary legislation such as section 6 of
the Protection of Trading Interests Act, and the establishment of a
joint tribunal to regulate the conduct of multinational corporations.
It is only in this manner that interested nations may accomodate
competing interests of sovereignty and extraterritoriality.
Stephen .4. Tsorir

